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JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE SETTLEMENT
FUNCTION
ROBERT F. NAGEL"
In City of Boerne v. Flores,' the Supreme Court repeats the
familiar proposition that it is the province and duty of the judi-
ciary "to say what the law is."2 But the Court also says that
Congress has "the duty to make its own informed judgment" on
the meaning of the Constitution.' The Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act (RFRA or the "Act")4 thus exceeded Congress's power
not because constitutional interpretation is outside the legisla-
tive function, but because the Act was based on an interpreta-
tion of the religion clauses that contradicted an existing judicial
precedent.5 Congress, in short, must defer to the Court's exist-
ing interpretations. The judiciary's power to interpret the Con-
stitution is not exclusive, but it is, according to Flores, supreme
as against the judgment of a coordinate branch of government.6
It is supreme not only in the sense that the Court will give legal
effect to its own precedent, but also in the sense that Congress
breached a duty when it enacted a law based on its own con-
trary opinion about the meaning of the Constitution.'
Important aspects of this doctrine of judicial supremacy have
been appearing in the case law with increasing frequency and
clarity. Components of the doctrine are visible in cases constrict-
ing the political question doctrine as well as in cases counter-
* Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado
School of Law.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
2. Id. at 2172 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
3. Id. at 2171.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
5. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 2172.
8. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (involving a House of
Representatives resolution that barred a representative from his seat).
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manding Congress's judgments about the meaning of the Com-
merce Clause,' separation of powers,"0 and the Tenth Amend-
ment. Moreover, the sense of self-confidence and self-impor-
tance that underlies judicial supremacy can be seen in cases
such as Cooper v. Aaron 2 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,"
which strongly disapprove of independent judgments on consti-
tutional issues by state and local officials. Flores is the culmina-
tion of this series of assertions of power by the federal judiciary.
As the Justices gradually have developed judicial supremacy as
a fact of institutional life, some thoughtful legal scholars have
begun to develop new justifications for it. In particular, the Har-
vard Law Review recently featured a tightly reasoned article,
authored by Professors Alexander and Schauer, that defends
judicial supremacy "without qualification." 4
In this Essay, I intend to lay the Flores opinion against the Alex-
ander and Schauer article. This comparison, I think, is instructive,
albeit in rather perverse ways. Both the opinion and the article
conclude that there is a congressional duty of deference, 5 but Al-
exander and Schauer's analysis demonstrates why the reasons
given by the Flores Court are inadequate. Moreover, Flores helps
to highlight flaws in Alexander and Schauer's analysis.
I. LEGISLATIVE DEFERENCE
Why, according to Flores, is Congress under a duty to defer to
existing judicial interpretations of the religion clauses? Justice
Kennedy's opinion develops the answer at length, but it can be
9. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (examining whether the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority).
10. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (analyzing the constitutionality
of the legislative veto in the Immigration and Nationality Act).
11. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (examining whether
Congress can require states to provide for the disposal of waste generated within
their borders).
12. 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (ordering the desegregation of Little Rock, Arkansas public
schools).
13. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion) (determining whether five Pennsylvania
law provisions substantially burdened a woman's right to an abortion).
14. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997).
15. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997); Alexander &
Schauer, supra note 14, at 1387.
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stated concisely: Congress has only enumerated powers, and its
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ("Section
5")16 is to enforce existing constitutional meaning, not to alter
that meaning.'7 The Court finds evidence for this distinction in
the Amendment's text,8 in its history,"9 and in the case law
that interprets the Amendment. 0 The source of Congress's du-
ty, then, is the Constitution itself.
From one perspective, it is odd for the Court to labor so hard
to show that the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize
Congress to alter the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nei-
ther Congress, the Executive, nor the Court is authorized to
change anything in the Constitution because the procedure for
changing the Constitution is prescribed in Article V,2 which
does not authorize unilateral changes by any branch of govern-
ment.' So by "change" or "alter" the Court must mean some-
thing short of amendment-perhaps the Court means the sort of
change that can occur during the process called "interpretation."
Put directly, then, the reasoning might seem to be that Section 5
authorizes Congress to enforce, but not to interpret, the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment. If this is what the Court
meant, then presumably RFRA would have been constitutional if
Section 5 had said, "Congress shall have power to enforce and
interpret the provisions of this amendment."
This, however, cannot be what the Court meant because, as I
indicated at the outset, Mores plainly states that Congress "has
not just the right but the duty to make its own informed judg-
ment on the meaning and force of the Constitution."' Congress
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
17. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
18. See id. at 2163-64.
19. See id. at 2164-67.
20. See id. at 2167-68.
21. U.S. CONST. art. V. To change the Constitution:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it neces-
sary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Applica-
tion of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes as Part of this Constitution, when rati-
fied by the Legislatures of three fourths of the Several States, or by Con-
ventions in three fourths thereof. ...
Id.
22. See id.
23. Fores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
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thus is authorized to interpret the whole Constitution, including
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's position, therefore,
must be that the terms and history of Section 5 require that,
when interpreting the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress defer to existing judicial precedents.
One of the many virtues of the Alexander and Schauer article
is that it demonstrates why this explanation for legislative def-
erence begs the question at issue. They write: "Even a written
constitution explicitly specifying its authoritative interpreter
would rest on a preconstitutional understanding about who
should be the authoritative interpreter of that provision."'
Thus, the force of the justification offered in Flores ultimately
depends not on the meaning of "enforce" in Section 5 but on the
Court's assumption that the judiciary is the authoritative inter-
preter of that word. For members of Congress who do not accept
this assumption, the main argument in Mores offers no reason
to defer to the Court's judgment that "enforce" means to inter-
pret constitutional provisions consistently with existing legal
precedent.' Certainly members could agree with the Court's
constitutional analysis, but they could also in good faith reject
that analysis. Indeed, they could reject that analysis even if it
were based on much stronger reasons than those actually offered
by the Court. Suppose that Section 5 had said, "Congress shall
enforce the provisions of this amendment in accordance with
applicable judicial precedent." If Congress believed that it should
interpret Section 5, then Congress could conclude that "in accor-
dance with" and "applicable" meant that it was free to ignore
precedents that in its judgment were inapposite, outdated, or
irrelevant. Given that the Mores Court's analysis is based on the
single, rather cryptic word "enforce," Congress surely could in-
terpret Section 5 so that it does not require legislative deference
on the meaning of the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To turn the matter around, consider again the hypothetical
possibility that Section 5 specifically authorized Congress "to
enforce and interpret" the provisions of the Amendment. Would
the outcome of Mores have had to be different? Not on the
Court's assumption that it was authorized to interpret the words
24. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 14, at 1369.
25. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
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"enforce and interpret." The Court could have insisted that in
context "to interpret" referred to circumstances where no appli-
cable judicial precedents existed and thus did not include the
power to interpret in a way that conflicted with judicial prece-
dent. Although this possibility seems farfetched, recall that un-
der the Court's working assumptions in Flores, Congress does
have the power both to enforce and interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment.26 The addition of the word "interpret" only con-
firms these assumptions and need not change the conclusion
that Congress's interpretive power must be exercised in accor-
dance with existing precedents.
In fact, of course, neither Section 5 nor any other provision in
the Constitution specifies an authoritative interpreter. As Alex-
ander and Schauer note, under this circumstance "it is even
clearer" that the document cannot settle whose interpretation is
authoritative. 7 In short, the Court's interpretation of Section 5
as requiring Congress to defer to judicial precedents does not
determine Congress's constitutional duties unless it can be dem-
onstrated that Congress must defer to the Court's interpretation
of Section 5.
In Flores, the Court makes no such demonstration. The closest
it comes to arguing for what Alexander and Schauer call a
"preconstitutional understanding"' is a brief paragraph at the
end of the opinion. Immediately after acknowledging that con-
gressional power includes constitutional interpretation, the ma-
jority states:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is pre-
served best when each part of the government respects both
the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations
of the other branches. When the Court has interpreted the
Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial
Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.29
In this passage, the Court does suggest a reason for its assump-
tion that the judiciary is the authoritative interpreter of Section
5. It says that "[olur national experience"-not constitutional
26. See id. at 2171.
27. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 14, at 1370.
28. Id. at 1369.
29. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
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meaning-supports the view that this division of responsibility
will best preserve the Constitution. The passage, however, is
unsatisfactory in a number of ways. First, the Court offers no
explanation for what it means by the word "best," so the histori-
cal claim is impossible to evaluate. Second, because the sub-
stance of the claim is only that preservation has worked best
when "each part of the government" respects the Constitution
and the determinations "of the other branches,"31 the passage,
unless it simply assumes the matter at issue, is consistent with
judicial deference to legislative interpretations. It does not help
to add that it is a judicial duty to say what the law is because
the Court has just conceded that interpretation is also-and al-
ways has been-a part of the legislative function.
Even if these problems are ignored, Alexander and Schauer
develop a third and decisive objection to justifications based on
historical experience. They write: "[A] principle of historical ref-
erence would owe its political validity and its status as law to
current acceptance .... The present, and not the past, decides
whether the past is relevant."3 2
The Court meets this point only by implication, indeed, only
in its use of the single word "preserved."3 3 Because of this word,
it is possible to read the passage as suggesting that we, today,
should be convinced, because of our historical experience, that
an extraconstitutional rule of legislative deference is desirable
because this rule best stabilizes constitutional meaning. Thus, at
the end of its opinion, the Court might be seen as refashioning
its earlier argument that the Fourteenth Amendment denies
Congress the power to alter the content of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Now making a prudential and institutional argu-
ment, the Court can be viewed as claiming that its precedents
must control when they are in conflict with a legislative inter-
pretation because otherwise the meaning of the Constitution
would change more than is desirable.
If persuasive, this argument provides a reason for members of
Congress to defer to judicial precedents even if they do not ac-
30. Id.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 14, at 1370.
33. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
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cept the Court's assumption that it is the authoritative inter-
preter of Section 5. The argument would be stronger, of course,
if it contained some indication of what kinds of changes or what
rate of change is undesirable. Fortunately, the Alexander and
Schauer article is an extended explanation of why change in an-
nounced constitutional meaning should be avoided. Not so fortu-
nately, thinking about Flores makes clear that this explanation
does not justify a rule of legislative deference.
II. LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY
Alexander and Schauer argue that stability in the announced
meaning of a law, including constitutional law, is desirable be-
cause the nature or purpose of law is "to settle authoritatively
what is to be done."' No matter what the content of the law,
the fact that a set of issues is settled allows people to coordinate
their behavior and induces various kinds of cooperative behav-
ior. 5 This "settlement function" cannot be served, they argue,
unless a preconstitutional norm establishes a single, authorative
interpreter among the various competitors. 6 They observe that
one such possible norm is judicial supremacy, but they quickly
add that "[tihis is not the only possible preconstitutional
norm."37 The chief alternative to judicial supremacy, according
to Alexander and Schauer, is that "each official decide for herself
what the Constitution requires." 3' The bulk of their remaining
analysis shows that deference to judicial precedent is preferable
to this "interpretive anarchy."
39
Readers of Flores will immediately recognize that Alexander
and Schauer's assertion that interpretive anarchy is the "chief
alternative"0 to judicial supremacy is questionable. RFRA is
only the latest in a long history of congressional statutes that
seek to substitute legislative judgments about the meaning of
the Constitution for judicial interpretations.4' Moreover, these
34. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 14, at 1371.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1377.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1379.
40. Id. at 1377.
41. Areas affected include: voting rights, eqdal protection, state sovereignty, the
commerce power, and separation of powers. See Louis FISiER & NEAL DEVINS, PO-
1998] 855
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congressional efforts often have been successful either as a prac-
tical or a formal matter. Indeed, some studies indicate that the
Court very rarely has strayed for long from strong expressions of
national political will about the meaning of the Constitution.42
Even so, interpretive anarchy may be, in some sense, a more
important alternative to judicial supremacy than legislative su-
premacy. Nevertheless, as Alexander and Schauer briefly ac-
knowledge," an argument that judicial supremacy is preferable
to interpretive anarchy is not an argument that judicial suprem-
acy is preferable to legislative supremacy. At most, Alexander
and Schauer establish that some authoritative interpretation of
the Constitution is desirable. Consequently, despite their evident
intention to discourage legislative challenges to judicial prece-
dents, their argument is quite consistent with the conclusion
that judges should defer to legislators at least some of the time.
If in Flores the Court had accepted Congress's interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause, the meaning of that clause would have
been settled, or at least so it would appear on the face of things.
If the Court had deferred to Congress, however, then Congress
would have been free to legislate again, and the effective mean-
ing of the Free Exercise Clause could be unsettled. "[Sihort-term
majoritarian control," as Alexander and Schauer put it," may
be incompatible with the settlement function. Here again, how-
ever, Flores complicates the picture. After all, when Congress
passed RFRA, it adopted the "compelling interest" test that the
Court itself had announced in cases such as Sherbert v.
Verner." Congress enacted RFRA only because the Court had
abandoned its own interpretation in favor of the doctrine of
minimal justification enunciated in Employment Division v.
Smith.46 Indeed, during the interim period between Smith and
Flores, the Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
LITICAL DYNAMIcs OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69-150, 229-80 (2d ed. 1996).
42. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court
as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957).
43. See id.; Alexander & Schauer, supra note 14, at 1377 n.80.
44. Id. at 1380; see also id. at 1376, 1377 n.80 (noting that the Constitution
serves as a "stabilizing force" on fundamental issues but the authoritative interpreta-
tion of the Constitution need not be the Supreme Court's).
45. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
46. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
856 [Vol. 39:849
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND SETTLEMENT
City of Hialeah47 significantly modified this second doctrine by
establishing a rather stringent motive test. If Congress now de-
fers to the judiciary on the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause,
the Court could change its interpretation yet again. Alexander
and Schauer do acknowledge, of course, that the Court can alter
its interpretations, but they assume that such variations will be
relatively rare and benign-opportunities to correct occasional
mistakes rather than threats to the settlement function of law.48
Their analysis thus elides the relevant question, namely: Which
institution, if assigned the role of authoritative interpreter, would
be less likely to change its interpretations?
Like the Flores majority, Alexander and Schauer may think
this question unimportant because as a matter of overwhelming
historical evidence, the Court has been more likely than Con-
gress to preserve constitutional meaning. If so, they, like the
Court, provide no documentation. How anyone who has lived
through a significant part of the modern period of tumultuous
judicial creativity could treat the relative stability of judicial
interpretations as self-evident is baffling.
The historical record demonstrates that the modern Supreme
Court has changed the effective meaning of the Constitution re-
peatedly and dramatically.49 The relative stability of judicial in-
terpretations, therefore, cannot simply be assumed or inferred
from idealizations of judicial conduct. The problem, however, is
not merely that Alexander and Schauer ignore what is, in fact, a
colorful judicial record of interpretive instability. The larger
problem is that there are reasons to suspect that their
"preconstitutional norm" of legislative deference 0 is a major
cause of the chaotic doctrinal record of the modern Court. These
reasons emerge from a closer examination of Flores.
47. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
48. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 14, at 1377 n.80 (claiming that adher-
ence to precedent makes courts less likely than the legislature or the executive to
alter interpretations); id. at 1386 (characterizing judicial alterations as corrections).
49. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CON-
SEQUENCES. OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 6-26 (1989).
50. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 14, at 1377.
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III. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
When Congress passed RFRA, why did it enact an abandoned
judicial doctrine into statutory language? Possibly, Congress
agreed with the Justices who once had adopted the compelling
interest test that this doctrine accurately reflected the values of
the Free Exercise Clause. Nevertheless, it is odd that Congress
did not modify the language more than it did. Even the addition
of a "least restrictive means" requirement, which the Court de-
scribes as new,51 was cribbed from other cases.5" Perhaps the
compelling interest test is a model not only of interpretive accu-
racy but also of statutory precision. But this is unlikely, given
the history of variation and uncertainty in the judiciary's use of
that doctrine until its abandonment. A more likely possibility
is that Congress utilized judicial language because members of
Congress share the widespread public belief that responsibility
for interpreting the Constitution is primarily judicial. They
were, after all, expressing an opinion about which Court was
right in interpreting the First Amendment, not claiming a fully
independent legislative prerogative of interpretation. In this
sense RFRA represented partial legislative deference to judicial
precedent.
Even a partial commitment to the doctrine of judicial suprem-
acy thus has consequences for the attitudes and behaviors of
members of Congress. One consequence is that in carrying out
their duties under Section 5, they will be inclined to use lan-
guage taken from the case law. If Congress had been more defer-
ential, it would have accepted the most current precedent as
authoritative and thus presumably would have incorporated into
its statute some combination of the rationality and motive tests.
If members of Congress had not been deferential at all, they
would have felt free to draft language wholly different from any
version of the Court's doctrinal formulations.
Flores, therefore, raises the question whether a
preconstitutional rule of legislative supremacy might produce
51. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1997).
52. See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
53. See Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect,
65 U. COLO. L. REv. 519, 529-34 (1994).
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statutes that served the settlement function more effectively
than judicialized language. In the abstract, it is possible that
Congress, if left entirely to its own devices, could use either
vague language that allows for little predictability or specific
language that allows for a high degree of predictability. We do
know that the Court's constitutional doctrines, especially in the
area of the religion clauses, are confusing, indeterminate, and
manipulable.' Consequently, an unconstrained Congress con-
ceivably might do better.
In fact, the circumstances of Flores suggest some common
sense reasons for believing that statutes enacted under a doc-
trine of legislative supremacy would serve the settlement
function better than doctrinal language does. To begin with the
most obvious point, RFRA was proposed because Smith was
enormously unpopular with large segments of the public. More-
over, an accountable body such as Congress presumably will, on
average, be likely to reflect popular sentiments more faithfully
than the relatively isolated Court. If an announced constitution-
al norm is popular, then it is probably safe to assume less pres-
sure will exist to change it.
In fact, one reason for the doctrinal gyrations that have typified
the modern Court's record is that many of its decisions have been
politically unpopular. 5 Despite widespread assumptions about
judicial supremacy, these controversial decisions have generated
acute political pressures that have been brought to bear on the
Court both formally-for example, through the confirmation pro-
cess-and informally-for example, by street demonstrations.56
Relative judicial isolation sometimes does enable judges to resist
such pressures, but by separating constitutional meaning from
public understanding and aspiration, it also creates an inherently
unstable situation. It is perplexing that sophisticated legal schol-
ars such as Alexander and Schauer seem to view legislative ac-
countability ("short-term majoritarian control")57 only as an im-
pediment to interpretive stability. Political insulation can produce
54. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Consti-
tutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 150 (1991).
55. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER: CENSORING
OURSELVES IN AN ANaous AGE 62-64, 71-80 (1994).
56. See id. at 27-43 (discussing confirmation hearings); id. at 45-59 (examining the
impact of political protests on the Court).
57. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 14, at 1380.
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circumstances likely to lead to interpretive revisions.
It is true that the doctrine of judicial supremacy could, be ex-
tended to prevent not just congressional recalcitrance but all
popular, nonprofessional disagreement with the Court's constitu-
tional interpretations. Language in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey5 flirts with this view, and the Alexander and Schauer
article also hints at this more radical position. 9 If this expand-
ed version of judicial supremacy were accepted, then it might be
thought that the Court's interpretations could depart from popu-
lar understandings and sentiments and still remain stable be-
cause virtually all political pressure to change those interpreta-
tions would be precluded. By almost any standard, this degree of
judicial supremacy is deeply controversial. It is also unrealistic.
Although the doctrine of judicial review is widely accepted, since
Marbury v. Madison" it never has succeeded in preventing sig-
nificant political resistance to the Court's pronouncements. No
matter what articles in the Harvard Law Review urge, it is in-
conceivable that reverential attitudes toward the Court could
grow so strong as to inhibit all significant political disagreement
with its decisions.
Still, it is possible that the Justices themselves might believe
that all, or most, political disagreement with their decisions is
inappropriate. Presumably, Alexander and Schauer think that it
would be desirable for members of the Court to adopt this view.
Perhaps they think that the Justices, fortified by a proper un-
derstanding of the settlement function of constitutional law, will
reject or ignore the political pressures that cannot be eliminated.
Once again, however, Flores complicates the picture. The case
demonstrates that even Justices who adopt the doctrine of judi-
cial supremacy will be affected by political pressure in ways that
undermine the settlement function.
58. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
59. See id. at 867 (stating that the Court's task in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), had been to call "the contending sides of a national controversy to end their
national division"); Alexander & Schauer, supra note 14, at 1386 (stating their oppo-
sition to "direct disregard by officials of Supreme Court opinions that are plainly
'good law,' in the sense of an overwhelming professional consensus"); see also id. at
1382-83 (discussing President Lincoln's decision not to defer to Dred Scott v. San-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).
60. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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In Mores, the Court did not ignore the political pressure mani-
fested in RFRA. Convinced that this sort of disagreement is
illegitimate, the Justices reacted to perceived defiance of their
authority by significantly unsettling the case law interpreting
Section 5.61 Indeed, Congress's intention to disagree with the
Court-a matter not even discussed in earlier Section 5 cas-
es -- is now arguably the crucial consideration in defining the
power "to enforce" in Section 5 .63 Litigators must now ponder
what other civil rights statutes might have been intended to or
designed to impose "substantive changes" in the level of consti-
tutional protections established by the Court.
In the process of reacting to congressional defiance, the Justic-
es also withdrew even further from their earlier interpretations
of the Free Exercise Clause. The Court declared that RFRA was
not "responsive to... unconstitutional behavior."' The Court
viewed Congress's intentions as improper and therefore conclud-
ed that a constitutional standard, which it had previously de-
creed to be constitutionally required in most respects, was not
even responsive to unconstitutional behavior.
I might be wrong to read Mores as establishing a new mea-
sure of congressional authority under Section 5 or as suggesting
an even more restrictive level of protection for the free exercise
of religion. The Court may subsequently construe Mores differ-
ently, but that is the point. In the meanwhile, constitutional
meaning has been unsettled. I do think that an examination of a
wide range of cases-in criminal procedure, school desegrega-
tion, abortion, free speech, and so on-shows that members of
the Court often react to perceived disagreement by altering con-
61. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
62. See, e.g., id.
63. The logic of Flores bears an uncanny resemblance to the logic of Romer v.
Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), in which the Court found that the public's purpose in
enacting the antigay rights initiative called Amendment 2 was illegitimate animosity.
See id. at 1627. In Romer, the Court inferred this motivation from what it viewed
as the otherwise inexplicable scope of the amendment. See id. at 1629. Similarly, in
Flores, the Court found RFRA to be so "out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object" that it could only be explained as an "attempt [at creating] a sub-
stantive change in constitutional protections." City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct.
2157, 2170 (1997). In each case, the Court inferred from overbreadth a conclusion
about impermissible motivation-animosity toward gays in the former, and dis-
agreement with the Court in the latter.
64. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
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stitutional meaning.5 This response is exactly what everyday
experience would predict. Acceptance of a preconstitutional rule
of judicial supremacy does not ensure that judges will concen-
trate on legal issues and ignore political pressures. On the con-
trary, such a rule produces a mind-set that is highly likely to
react angrily to political disagreement.
To the extent that the Court uses constitutional interpretation
as a club to punish what it sees as political recalcitrance, its
interpretations are likely to become, at least for a while, even
more unacceptable to the public at large. This, I think, is the
history in a number of areas, including school busing and abor-
tion.66 In the end, of course, political pressures may die away
as the public sees the costs of disagreement mount inexorably.
But what the record shows is that in important instances the
Court eventually yields to the pressures generated by its escalat-
ing interpretations.
When the Court yields, it does so in ways that maintain at
least the appearance of consistency. This appearance, of course,
is exactly what should be expected of judges who accept the rule
of judicial supremacy as fundamental. But in denying or obscur-
ing the nature of their own behavior, they tend to announce doc-
trines that are especially unlikely to serve the settlement func-
tion. For instance, in Casey, the Court emphatically denied that
political pressure should affect its decisions on abortion and
loudly reaffirmed the basic holding of Roe v. Wade.67 A plurality
of the Justices then jettisoned the notorious but clear trimester
system and substituted an "excessive burden" test, the opera-
tional meaning of which can only be determined on a case-by-
case basis."
The seeds of this same sequence can already be located in the
changing case law regarding Section 5. Suppose Congress reacts
to Fores by enacting new civil rights laws that test the Court's
will. Suppose further that the Court ratchets up the incipient
doctrines in FMores, perhaps by requiring a closer and closer fit
65. See NAGEL, supra note 55, at 71-77.
66. See id. at 79-80.
67. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868-69 (1992) (plurality opin-
ion).
68. Id. at 873-79.
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between the effects of the laws and the Court's precedents. This
escalation would eventually invalidate laws that are now over-
whelningly viewed as important and useful. At that point, the
Court would be likely to deflate Fores while insisting that noth-
ing was changing. Motive inquiry, for example, is similar to the
undue burden test in that it is ad hoc and would provide conve-
nient cover for judicial retreat. As the school desegregation cas-
es69 show vividly, "illegitimate motive" is a standard that per-
mits superficial stability in announced meaning but also allows
extremely wide variations in operational meaning.70
The rule of judicial supremacy, in short, cannot be evaluated
simply as a jurisprudential concept. If the rule is being recom-
mended for use in the political system we actually have, then its
likely psychological and institutional consequences must be con-
sidered. Those consequences may or may not be healthy on other
grounds, but they seem rather clearly at odds with the settle-
ment function of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Alexander and Schauer demonstrate that the rule of judicial
supremacy cannot be inferred from the Constitution, as the
Court in Flores attempts to do. But their effort to deduce that
rule from the settlement function of law is in turn undermined
by Flores, which poses a question that Alexander and Schauer
largely pass over. That question is: Why is judicial supremacy
more likely than legislative supremacy to serve the settlement
function? Fores, despite its own argument, suggests that a per-
suasive answer to this question is unlikely because it reminds us
of the many ways that judicial supremacy operates in our politi-
cal system to undermine stability and predictability.
Nevertheless, judicial supremacy may be superior to interpre-
tive anarchy. Nothing in this Essay has dealt directly with that
possibility. Moreover, it should be noted that jurists, such as
those in the Fores majority, and scholars, such as Alexander
and Schauer, may all believe at some level that there can be no
69. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
70. Cf Brinkman, 433 U.S. at 414 (noting that findings of discriminatory motive
are problematic in "multimembered public bodies" such as school boards).
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practical difference between legislative supremacy and interpre-
tive anarchy. They may think that if Congress can challenge
judicial authority, then there is no stopping point. When other
political officials see that the national legislature can rightfully
resist judicial precedent, all politicians will make the same
claim. And according to the very argument I have made, in our
political system no preconstitutional argument in favor only of
legislative supremacy is likely to change that fact.
This point suggests to me that interpretive anarchy is the on-
ly available option. The inevitablity of anarchy seems to be im-
plied because I can see no reason why the force of the argument
would not also apply to judicial supremacy. Once Americans see
that judges claim to be entitled to make interpretations that are
authoritative, other officials inevitably will make the same claim
on at least some issues some of the time. This dynamic suggests
that we must always have had some significant amount of inter-
pretive anarchy, and I think that we have.
It would follow that interpretive anarchy must not be as in-
compatible with stability and predictability as judges and schol-
ars often assume. There are many reasons why this might be
so.7' As anyone who has successfully navigated a busy city side-
walk knows, social coordination is not only a matter of rules but
also of unspoken assumptions and inarticulate experience. In
very significant respects, the American constitutional system
has been stable because history and culture have made many
issues too clear to need words and too certain to permit disputes.
Adjudication, along with preconstitutional beliefs about the au-
thoritativeness of judicial interpretations, no doubt tends in
some ways to reinforce this massive bedrock of common instinct
and expectation. In other ways, though, constitutional litigation
shatters this heritage. The exact relationships between legal
rules and deeper cultural understandings present many fascinat-
ing questions. Neither the Constitution as written nor abstract
jurisprudence will yield the answers.
71. See NAGEL, supra note 49, at 17-26.
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